



THE SOCIAL PATHOLOGY OF AGGRESSION 
GABRIEL POPA 
e will begin by stating some premises, part of them which are 
more speculative than scientific ones. This means that it is not our 
task here to verify them, but they could be found in some works 
that deal with this concept in one way or another. The first and the most 
speculative one is that aggression as a capacity is a psychic phenomena that 
pertains only to human nature. We may say that some animals behave 
aggressively, we may say that nature is aggressive, but we think that the 
feature of aggression is attributed to them only relatively. The second premise is 
that even when some aggressive comportment is directed towards some 
abstract, impersonal or some organic being others than human being, the 
grammar of the word suggests that the original object of aggression is some 
other human being. We don’t usually say that some-thing was aggressed, but 
that some-one was the object of an aggression. Something indeed could be 
the object of an action that could be interpreted as aggressive, as destruction, 
annihilation, but, similar to our mention before, these are only derivative 
objects, or, more likely, substitutions of an original object. Out third premise 
is that aggression is a transitive feature which directs a comportment or an 
action against some other human being. Aggression is always orientated and 
the sense of its orientation is that “against”. We will see what happens when 
the object of aggression is apparently missing and we will find then that 
aggression has identified the object and the subject: aggression has turned 
against its place of departure, against itself. 
We may then offer a preliminary definition of aggression as a psychic 
phenomenon that may be used to characterize an intentional action that is 
always oriented against some other human being or beings. As long as some 
action could be interpreted as aggressive, the subject of an aggressive action 
is said to be an aggressive person. As a constant feature of someone’s 
comportment, aggression may be or become pathological, and then it could 
be reduced to some other psychic deviations like neurosis or psychosis, the 
object of some psychological therapy. But beyond its proper pathological 
manifestations, we may say that all people are capable to act more or less 
aggressively. We can all imagine some cases, events which could provoke us 
to behave this way. If aggression is a latent feature of our psychic life, it could 





The question is how and when do we know that an action is turned into 
aggression? What makes an action an aggressive one? Within the WW2, 
Germany was considered an aggressive state. Russia is now being considered 
an aggressive state, and ISIS is considered an aggressive organization. What 
do we mean by these statements? What are their truth conditions? In fact, as 
the current debate about the political dimension of aggression is concerned, 
the crime of aggression is related to the individual responsibility for illegal 
war. An internationally agreed concept of political aggression would enable 
the international courts to ‘judge and punish political and military leaders 
for planning, preparing, initiating and executing illegal wars’ (Weisbord, 
2009, p.4). Illegal war means here the crossing of a state’s border that 
threatens the community and its members forcing them to fight and die in 
defense of that state, or undermines that community’s ability to protect the 
human rights of its members (Weisbord, 2009, p.4). The cited work has as 
its main concern the conceptualization of aggression in order for it to stand 
as a fully fledged premise that may serve as a foundation for judging and 
punishing the crime of aggression in contemporary historical context where 
the main aggressive organization are no longer the states but smaller, 
transnational ones, like the well known Al Qaeda or ISIS. We will not enter 
into this debate which is not our concern here, but what interest us here are 
the main criteria that may serve to consider an action as aggressive. Our first 
mention is that, even if a state or some other organization is considered 
aggressive, the responsibility is to be found individually. The one or the ones 
to be held responsible, judged and punished are the key persons involved in 
that action, as preparing, initiating or executing it. The second mention is that 
aggression is related to some action that is punishable – like the illegal war.  
Our third mention is the difficulty to conceptualize aggression. Even if we 
have only searched so far for the political quest for the concept of aggression, 
it could be easily emphasized that this difficulty pertains to any of the social 
levels that deals with this type of actions. We believe this fact to be due to the 
hermeneutical dimension of any definition that applies to aggression, 
regardless if we understand here the psychic phenomenon, the capacity or 
propensity to aggression, or its effectiveness as an action. This means that 
any attempt to conceptualize and define aggression should deal first with the 
issue of interpreting an action, thought, intention as an aggressive one. This 
interpretation, which takes place for the first time in common language, 
should unfold itself and become one that is theoretically founded, in order 
for it to be institutionalized. Something is preserved at each stage of this 




diminished, attenuated or even annihilated, and this is the job of moral or 
religious precepts or of the coercive system.  
It could be rightfully objected that there are some forms of aggression that 
are accepted and acceptable in most of the so called civilized social 
communities. From the beginning we should state that, as we have seen in 
our previous mention of the illegal war, aggression is accepted as a form of 
self-defense, regardless if are talking here about defense war, of self-defense 
personal actions. Beyond that, there are many forms of aggression that could 
be emphasized through any sociological research into the categories of 
aggression, like politics, music, sports, popular manifestations or cultural 
events like movies, theatrical plays and so on. So it seems that even if society 
is rejecting some forms of aggression, the same society is trying to preserve 
some of its manifestations. We will see a reason for this dialectic of presence 
and absence of aggression in what follows.  
We should conclude our introductory part here by saying that, for all that 
we have found out so far, aggression seems to be a social phenomenon, and 
this means that aggression has a definite social component that is a part of 
any attempt to understand and define it. Aggression, as a primary phenomenon, 
is always accompanying an intention, thought or action but only to direct 
this action against some other human being. An encounter between two or 
more human beings constitutes the necessary condition for any aggressive 
action. But, it could be said that this is not something that deserve an 
investigation. We all know, even if we did not put our thoughts into it, that 
aggression is something directed against someone and that aggression is 
something that, at least in its harmfully manifestations, is something that 
any civilized society should punish and eradicate. Aggression is condemnable 
when it impinges some other’s rights as they are recognized within that 
society. Aggression is then some behavioral disposition that is not to be let to 
become manifest when it harms other people. But there is another thing to 
aggression that may deserve a critical exploration, a closer inspection, a fact 
that could serve as an explanatory momentum for both the development of 
organized/civilized societies and the development of human beings as social 
beings. Aristotle had said that men are social beings, they need the company 
of other people and this is one of anyone’s most primary instincts. But there 
are some other contents that point into the fact that, beyond being social 
beings, the first organized communities arose from the need to protect their 
members from both mutual aggression and aggression from some other 
people, which are not part of that social organization. It seems that we 
should add the encounter of human beings as a sufficient condition for 




Stemming from Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, Francis Fukuyama 
in his work The End of History and the Last Man, emphasize the thymotic 
part of the soul as the one that could best explain what he considers to be the 
process of historical evolution which ends in the liberal democratic societies. 
Interpreted in Hegelian terms as the “struggle for recognition”, it is said to 
constitute the most important, both active and explicative, moment of the 
historical reason whose finality is the mutual harmless recognition of this desire 
for recognition. The latter is the desire to be desirable in other people’s eyes, 
the desire to be recognized as valuable human beings. The locus or the seat 
of this desire is that part of the soul of which Plato was saying that is crucial 
for the guardians of its imagined city in his Republic. The connection 
between thymos and the desire for recognition is made through investing the 
thymos with that ‘propensity to invest the self with a certain value and to 
demand recognition for that value’ (Fukuyama, 1992, p.XVII). The connection 
between thymos, desire for recognition and our discussion about aggression 
will be made through the statement that, at the beginning of the history, the 
former’s expression was actually a fight, a struggle for recognition that 
determines its actors to put their lives at stakes. The first organized societies 
were hierarchically established ones, of masters and slaves, and the main 
criterion for this division was one’s determination to risk his life in order for 
him to be recognized as superior. The idea of the end of history is grounded 
in the presumable finality of the historical process, that is considered not as 
the end of historical events, but as the final stage of the social organizing 
evolution, allowing a mutual, universal recognition of human rights as such, 
a recognition that does not suppose that anyone should effectively be in 
danger or losing his life on that way. As it appears at the end of history, the 
society is able to reconcile the two most fundamental human instincts or 
desires, the desire for recognition and the self preservation.  
As any discussion about the finality and the end of history wishes to be 
meaningful, it also has to consider what has been called the nature condition 
of humanity or ‘the first man’ in Fukuyama’s expression. In few words, we 
are talking here about human nature before the first appearance of 
something like a organized community, before civilization has arrived. 
According to Hegel, or more likely to one of his well known interpreters, 
Alexandre Kojeve, beyond men’s ‘positive’ desires toward something that can 
satisfy his bodily needs like hunger, thirst and so on, common to both men 
and their genus – the animal, man also desires that he is recognized by his 
fellows and this desire for recognition is the one that makes the human being 
a social being. This desire for recognition has, as its first consequence, the 




is towards its recognition as human being or human nature. This propensity 
of human nature towards recognition is the one that stands at the beginning 
of the history as the key moment involved in the constitution of civilized 
societies but, as we already mentioned, the desire for recognition is turned 
into a real battle, into a bloody battle. These primal societies are nothing 
more than the outcome of this struggle for recognition that could end in one 
of the following ways: death or both combatants, death of one of them, or 
survival of both and the establishing of a society that is divided between 
masters and slaves. The masters are the ones willing to risk their lives until 
the end while the slaves are the ones submitting to the preservation of life.  
As Fukuyama admits, this may sound strange to our present days. And it 
should sound strange in any civilized society that has as its main concern the 
protection of civil rights, life being the first of them. As we may contend that 
the desire for recognition still plays some role in our daily routine, with its 
most visible expressions like the wish of fame and social status, we do not see 
them as disguised forms of that primary desire that may turn in the loss of 
life. We are no longer in a position that requires someone to put his life at 
stake along the way to his being recognized as a human being. The bourgeois 
ethics of proper liberal political philosophy that has been developed starting 
with the writings of Hobbes and Locke in the XVIIth Century, has always 
been focused on a dialectic of desire and reason. According to this, as we may 
observe in some of wittings of the other grounding figures of contemporary 
democracy as Rousseau’s social contract, the constitution of a civilized 
society has as its main goal the domination of reason over the other parts of 
the human soul like instincts and desires. This takes the form of a rational 
(reason-able), conscious, self-imposed renunciation of the satisfaction that is 
demanded by one’s deep, natural desires as it is the only way to assure the 
survival of the individual, as a member of a community that could protect 
him against mutual or some other’s violent actions. This has been done only 
through enhancing the surviving instinct and turning it against a more and 
more impoverished and diminished desire for recognition. 
But the “thymotic” dimension of the soul is not only orientated towards 
aggression as we may understand it by stating that its primary expression is 
that struggle, violent ‘war of every man against every man’ as we see in 
Hobbes. Thymos is also that part of the soul that is the seat every man’s most 
desirable features like courage, justice, spiritedness and so on. As we know, 
Plato’s tripartite division of the soul is paralleled by his social tripartite 
division where the defenders of the city are the most powerful expression of 
that component of the soul which is thymos. When orientated towards the 




then justified when it is used for protection against what may threaten the 
city and the social order within its walls. But, we may ask, even if the aggression 
as a feature of the thymos may play an important role in defending some 
social organization like Plato’s city, why should we preserve the same impetus 
toward aggression in what concerns the human psyche? The guardians, 
defenders or soldiers have to protect some social order that is commonly 
accepted within some society, but what is to defend in case of some individual? 
His life is already protected within that society through laws and law 
enforcement institutions. When attached to the class of guardians the 
preservation of thymos could be something that has benefits for the entire 
society, as the evaluation that is part of the thymos is something that has 
been objectively accepted by the large majority of its members. But when 
internalized, the same evaluation is something subjective, which pertains to 
our own ability to evaluate ourselves, and then it could be, and usually it is, 
something that could contradict other’s evaluation of our selves or of their 
selves. Someone’s desire for recognition imposes itself to other people and 
then it may become aggressive as it collides with others evaluating us. When 
detached from its objective ground, the desire for recognition becomes what 
is called megalothymia, the subjective impetus toward recognition as better 
than the others. Megalothymia is someone’s own hyper evaluation that is the 
feature of aristocratic societies, a radicalization of the desire for recognition 
that requires that our qualities are recognized as superior to others.  
There is a question that remains unanswered in Fukuyama about the 
difference between the desire for recognition and its hyper version, which 
makes it difficult to separate what is a universal feature of the human soul 
from its radicalization. But there are two things that deserve to be highlighted at 
the end of our discussion of his work. The first of them is that is it the desire 
for recognition that first delivers us to aggression towards other people, and 
that it is something that characterizes the first recorded encounters between 
humans. Beside the original war that set people against people as it is 
recollected by the Locke and Hobbes, this is an intuition that first affects the 
encounter or people as such, and we mention here one of Sartre’s plays 
where hell is said to be the timeless encounter that brings people starring 
into each other’s eyes forever. But, besides being the trigger of aggression, 
the same desire for recognition is one of the most important moments of the 
constitution of civilized society, as they were means of protection against that 
aggression. The second mention is that the historical process is a transition 
from megalothymia, the desire to be recognized as better, to isothymia, the 
desire to be recognized as equal. The object of the desire for recognition has 




societies. The aristocrat has been convinced to turn himself into some 
business or political man, while the social privileged remains of the desire for 
recognition is that desire to equality, equity and so on.  
The most efficient social mechanism that has been employed in order to 
assure the dominance of the self preservation instinct over the desire for 
recognition was not the one that has been imagined by either Hobbes, Locke 
or even Machiavelli, which were opposing the thymos to self preservation or 
to itself, but the metaphysics of the Christianity and its two fundamental 
features, the sense of culpability and the guilty conscience. These are two of 
its most important insights that have helped the democratic, civilized 
societies to overcome the aggression of human nature and impose the right 
to universal recognition. With or without metaphysics, this is said to be the 
end of history: the last man is the one that embraces all men as fully 
recognizable in their status as human beings. 
Even if we are not ready to contend something like the finality of history, 
we are, by large, living in a world that is more successful than the preceding 
ones as long as the preservation of human life and human rights is concerned. 
This could be disputed, but Fukuyama offers some powerful reasons for his 
assertion which will not be discussed here. As we saw, the preservation of 
human life has to be asserted against the other fundamental human instinct 
that is the aggressive desire for recognition or the thymotic dimension of 
one’s temperament. But, along with the feeling of security and even happiness 
that is continuously growing in these days, there are some issues with the 
civilized world beyond the ones that pertain to the development of the 
natural sciences that may affect what is called the ecological system of our 
planet. We will refer here to some of the issues that are concerned with the 
ego-logical and not eco-logical, and there are many researches that show that 
the growth of civilization is often accompanied by a growth in psychic 
disorders, of which the most important is psychic depression. Not turning 
ourselves in psychologist, we will only discuss the non-pathological part of 
these types of issues that may be well characterized as a feeling of discontent 
that from time to time impedes our pursuing of personal happiness, even in a 
world that offers more and more means for attaining our aims, material, 
professional or even ethical ones.  
That sense of discontent, uneasiness or even anguish is the main object of 
one of Freud’s late writings entitled, in its English translation, Civilization 
and its Discontents. As this feeling is not something that could be easily 
explained and reduced to a more basic pathology, the word Freud had 
chosen for its expression is not a usual one: Unbehagen. For its translation, 




“discontent” as the most expressive term for Freud’s intentions. The story, 
critically reduced to its basics, unfolds as follows: the rise of civilization is 
something that has developed in order to protect man’s basic needs for 
protection against both nature and his fellows. This is not a new story, as we 
already saw that is something like a common assumption among the 
civilization’s story tellers. And what follows, as even Freud admits, is no 
news. Civilization has its counterpart that is set against individual’s basic 
tendencies and impulses, one of them being the impetus to aggression 
towards other people.  
The main two pillars of the civilization that Freud emphasizes are the 
compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity, and the power 
of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object, 
the woman--, and made the woman unwilling to be deprived of the part of 
herself which had been separated off from her child. Eros and Ananke [Love 
and Necessity] have become the parents of human civilization too. (Freud, 
1961b, p.48)  
In order to attract people towards each other, civilization had to 
institutionalize someone’s natural affection for other in two ways: first, the 
erotic compulsion had to be restricted to a single companion, and then, it 
had to be sublimated while its object was displaced towards his fellows. We 
are now talking about several ways of loving someone, which are rooted in 
the ancient division that was made by Christianity between Eros and Agape. 
Anyway, it seems that the work of civilization had to be on the right track 
while love was supposed to be the common denominator of human societies. 
What could be wrong with that picture which is an approximation of the 
Christian ideal demand of loving your neighbor more than you love yourself 
or loving your enemy? The problem is that, if we turn to ourselves, any 
introspection which is not superficial, any critical evaluation of our real 
intentions shows that these are by far removed from that ideal. The Christian 
command seems contra factual. The historical factuality shows that men are 
not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend 
themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among 
whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of 
aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential 
helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their 
aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to 
use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate 
him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo homini lupus 




If we remember what has been said before about the spring and growth of 
the first communities out man’s state of nature, there are reasons to be 
conjectured that the ideal command of universal love is nothing that a 
reaction against this natural tendency to aggression. As we remember, we 
concluded our discussion about Fukuyama’s last man by stating that the 
most effective social mechanism for taming this aggressive impetus was the 
Christian metaphysics and its Pandora’s Box where men first found the gifts 
of culpability and guilty conscience. What Freud does is to trace both this 
tendency to aggressiveness and its counterpart back to some more primary 
functions of our psychical apparatus. There is one mention to be made here. 
Freud’s writing that concerns us here is one of his latest and the author had 
to suppose that the reader is already accustomed with at least some 
psychoanalytical concepts and theories that he had been developed. The 
corollary of this is that, even if Freud’s latest writings may be considered as 
engaging large phenomena like history, culture and civilization, his main 
assumptions and concepts that are employed in order to explain and clarify 
these processes are difficult to understand and interpret unless someone get 
familiarized with the former ones. This is a deficiency of the interpretation 
that cannot be overcome here but we will try to present some of Freud’s 
theoretical acquisitions that may concern the reader of Freud’s analysis of 
historical phenomena. The structure of human psychic is the expression of a 
continuous movement of psychical energy, while its main principle is the 
constancy principle or the pleasure principle. The pleasure principle is the 
one that is trying to make us all happy by keeping the excitation of the 
psychic to a minimum. When the psychic is excited, from either internal or 
external stimulus, it delivers a quantity of energy that has to be diminished, 
and this is made by satisfying the demands of the former impulses. But the 
Ego soon discovers that his desires are impossible to be satisfied on its own, 
without considering what is external to it. Then, as the Ego is confronted 
with reality, another principle intervenes in order to assure the Ego’s 
survival, and that is the principle of reality which regulates the functioning of 
the pleasure principle, according to the demands of the surrounding world.  
What has to be considered is that these principles are opposing each 
other, the pleasure principle continuously demanding satisfaction beyond 
the reality principle, while the latter is concerned to impose social constrains 
and restrictions to the former, that makes its demands socially accepted. 
This antinomic couple is for the first time questioned in one of Freud’s essays 
from 1920, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where we witness the apparition 
of another primary compulsion that set the movement of psychic energy 




said to be even more primary that the pleasure orientated movement of 
psychic energy that was seeking to preserve the survival of the Ego and of the 
human species. The instinct of death is still a preserving one, but that is set 
to preserve some initial, archaic state of development, the inorganic one. It is 
set to destroy the units that were created though the double play of the 
pleasure and reality principles.  
The death instinct is operating on all levels, biological, psychological and 
cultural, but its most obvious dimension or representative is the appetite for 
destruction that is discoverable on the large scale of historical events. While 
both the development of an individual and societies are the function of the 
preservation instincts of hunger and love, ego instincts and object instincts, 
the other main component of the same development is the compulsion to 
aggression that is a derivative of the death instinct. The two pillars are not so 
much Eros and Ananke, but Eros and Death. The aggression brought by the 
death instinct that is first directed towards Ego’s own destruction, is usually 
diverted and directed towards some external object, through a defense 
mechanism of the Ego that is the work of the Eros. The paradox is that the 
death impulse does not contradict the satisfaction demanded by the pleasure 
principle, and Freud will emphasize the narcissist satisfaction of a carried on 
aggressive act, or the satisfaction that is felt through sadism. The social 
dimension of aggression comes as a confirmation of its psychological feature 
where it is usually found to accompany the Eros, as we may find out in 
phenomena like narcissism and sadism.  
The dialectic of Eros and Thanatos is more complicated and more refined 
then it first appears. When we revise our lecture, it seems as we encounters 
more and more paradoxes in Freud’s analysis. Freud is only mentioning that 
the diversion of the death impulse and its aggressive corollary towards the 
external world is a work of Eros. But Eros is the one that, in the mean time, 
is also the principle of attraction that creates the human communities that 
evolve into larger social aggregates. There is no clear explanation of this 
seemingly contradiction, and we have to search for it into the intricate 
relationships between the death instinct and erotic one, or the ego-istic 
instinct of preservation versus the species preservation.  
As Freud’s analysis is unfolding on both levels we see that the individual 
development parallels the development of social communities. As the 
aggressiveness of the ego first turns against itself, when diverted, the social 
pathology of aggression set it against society, turning it into the greatest 
enemy of the civilization. And the society retaliates by restricting the 
satisfaction demanded, by institutionalizing the punishment for aggressive 




internal representative of the external authority, the Super-Ego. This is a 
later acquisition of both psychic and social development that evens the act of 
aggression with the mere aggressive intention, and this is the moment when 
the guilty conscience is making its appearance. The aggressive conscience is 
the internal substitute of the aggression that is to be expected from external 
authority and we may find a proportional direct relation between the 
renunciations that are voluntary adopted and the enhancement of the 
aggression on behalf of the super-ego. Freud offers a quantitative – economical 
explanation of this paradoxical relationship. As the quantity of aggressive 
energy remains the same within the psychic apparatus, the aggressive energy 
that has been disaffected by voluntary renunciation is took over by the super-
ego increasing its own aggressiveness towards the ego. The outcome is the 
continuous growth of that feeling of uneasiness or discontent that parallels 
any movement of the civilization. 
Fukuyama contends that we may be more and more happier, but maybe 
the end of history means living in societies composed only by members that 
had lost entirely their desire to be recognized as better, their willingness to 
fight for and protect the common good, their sense of justice, and these are 
the societies that have as their most valuable possession the desire of 
individual to self preservation. If we listen to Freud, the sense of discontent 
is the one that could reverse the direction towards universal happiness, as 
the limit of this feeling is the growth of psychic disorders while psychic 
depression could turn into the one of the largest phenomena in the following 
years (for this, I find one work to be inspiring, The Noonday Daemon, An 
Anatomy of Depression, written by Andrew Solomon, but there are many 
books and articles on this topic). 
So, what are we left with, at the end of our brief journey through 
aggression, history, happiness, love and death? Beside it being an object of 
analysis and explanation, aggression poses a problem: it is a phenomenon to 
which we should all oppose but, at the same time, it seems to be a 
constitutional feature of our own and of our society’s development. If, as it 
seems that our discussion has turned us all into bad, aggressive people, what 
could be said about the moral debate which usually opposes the human 
nature and the moral law? One of Kant’s moral axiom suppose that we should all 
behave as listening to a maxim that we wish to turn into an universal one. 
We surely don’t want other people to behave aggressively towards us. We 
react badly to aggression, although aggressiveness is something that is a 
latent feature of anyone’s comportment and we remember Sartre’s words, 
that we don’t need some other world to find hell, it helps us just to look into 




Reflecting the psychological analysis back to its previous sociological/ 
political one, we may say that, even if aggression has as its moment of 
departum the encounter of two or more human beings, the aggressiveness is 
said to already predetermine our attitude towards them. Civilization may 
bring that harmless mutual recognition that may satisfy our desire, but, if we 
listen to Freud, aggression is then only internalized and turned against 
ourselves. Connecting the death instinct with aggressiveness makes the latter 
indispensable since we didn’t yet find a way to dispense with death.  
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